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Board-CEO friendship ties and firm value: Evidence from US firms 
                                                               Abstract 
This study examines the impact of board-CEO friendship ties on firm value and explores 
potential channels through which changes in firm value may be conveyed, based on a sample 
of 1,696 publicly listed firms in U.S. over the period of 2000-2014. The study reveals that 
board-CEO friendship ties have a negative and economically meaningful impact on firm 
value, as measured by Tobin’s Q and Total Q. Regarding potential channels of firm value, we 
show that the negative influence of board-CEO friendship ties on firm value is reduced in 
firms with greater board advising requirements but intensified in firms with higher board 
monitoring needs. We also find social ties tend to destroy firm value whereas professional 
ties do not. Our results are robust to endogeneity concerns, and after controlling for board-
CEO professional ties. 
 
 Keywords: Board-CEO friendship ties; Firm value; Agency theory, Directors  



























Board directors fulfil an important corporate governance role. They contribute advice and 
counsel as well as overseeing and monitoring CEO behaviour on behalf of firm shareholders 
and wider stakeholders (Westphal, 1999; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 
2007; Linck et al., 2008; Hwang and Kim, 2009; Zorn et al., 2017; Talavera, 2018). While, 
standard agency theoretical predictions stress a crucial role of corporate boards in reducing 
costs associated with the separation of firm ownership and control, the resource-based view 
(RBV) focuses on value added to the firm through the strength of directors’ social capital 
(e.g. formal and informal network ties and external contingencies) and human capital (e.g. 
expertise, and reputation) (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003)
1
. Together these theories posit that 
heterogeneity in board composition should have significant implications for firm value. It is 
therefore not surprising that the impact of board heterogeneity on firm-level outcomes has 
been the subject of increasing attention in the academic literature (Linck et al., 2008; Stevens 
and Radin, 2009; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Fracassi and Tate, 2012; Falato et al., 2014; 




Despite this attention, most studies focus on the effects of board-CEO social ties on board 
effectiveness, board selection, and the performance of new product introduction (Westphal, 
1999; Wu, 2008; Hoitash, 2011; Hwang and Kim, 2009; Krishnan et al., 2011; Nguyen, 
2012; Bruynseels and Cardinaels, 2014; Rose et al., 2014; Khanna et al., 2015; Schmidt, 
2015; Houson et al., 2017). Relatively, little attention has been given to the effects of 
friendship ties between board directors and CEOs on firm value, including the channels 
                                                        
1 The value that individual directors can potentially contribute is highlighted in survey-based evidence, which 
suggests that institutional investors are willing to pay a premium for effective board governance (Investor 
Relations Business, 2000).   
2  Extant empirical evidence supports the assertion that heterogeneity in board composition has significant 
implications for corporate actions and that board effectiveness varies with, for example, social connections with 
the CEO (Westphal, 1999; Nguyen, 2012; Rose et al., 2014), board independence (Nguyen, 2012; Zorn et al., 
2017), directors current and past appointments on corporate boards (Sundaramurphy et al., 2014), and whether 














through which firm value may occur (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Fracassi and Tate, 2012)
3
. 
Yet researchers such as Raheja (2005); Harris and Raviv (2006) and Adams at al. (2010) 
argue that the way boards are composed may bolster the credibility of the firm to outside 
investors, reduce cost of capital and increase firm value. For example, it may be argued that 
board-CEO social ties
4
 may send a negative signal to the market because such ties may 
reduce effective monitoring, thereby engendering agency costs and resulting in erosion of 
firm value (Daily and Dalton, 1994). 
Another argument why social ties should matter is given by RBV, which supports the 
assertion that social network capabilities of top management teams can provide an important 
basis for firms’ competitive advantages (Shrader and Siegel, 2007; Daily, Certo and Dalton, 
2000; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). In turn, these competitive advantages are conjectured to 
be determinants of firm value because they influence a firm’s strategy and decision-making 
(Peteraf, 1993; Pennings et al., 1998). Emphasizing the importance of board-CEO 
relationships, Leana and Van Baren (1999: 539) contend such relationships serve as “a 
resource reflecting members’ level of collective goal orientation and shared trust, which 
creates value by facilitating successful collective action”. Several studies (Barney, 1991; 
Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Peteraf, 1993) argue that board-CEO social ties are likely to 
produce a competitive advantage and improve firm value because they are intangible, rare, 
and socially complex, which makes them difficult to imitate. Moreover, it is argued that 
board-CEO social ties should matter for firm value because they influence board advising and 
monitoring functions. In particular, the board’s advising role, which is often limited by 
information asymmetries, may be reduced due to pre-existing network connections between 
                                                        
3
 Board-CEO friendship ties are common in large U.S. firms, with existing evidence highlighting that CEOs 
regularly nominate friends to become firm directors (Westphal and Stern, 2006). In our sample, a typical CEO 
has a mean (median) 0.2371 (0.2737) director friendship ties. 














the board and the CEO. Consequently, board-CEO social ties may improve the board’s 
advising role, leading to increases in firm value. Conversely, from an agency cost perspective 
such social ties could be associated with lower firm value. For example, Fracassi and Tate 
(2012) demonstrate that CEO-board network ties weaken the intensity of board monitoring. 
Operationalizations of board-CEO relationships, which rely on both agency theory and 
RBV assumptions, offer interesting and seemingly conflicting predictions as to how they 
might impact firm value. They also yield two key questions: 1) what are the firm value 
implications of board-CEO social ties?; and 2) assuming such ties matter, through which 
channels do board-CEO network connections influence firm value? Wu (2008) points out that 
the effects of the relationship between the board and top executives on organisational 
outcomes remains inconclusive and under-researched. More recently, Kumar and Zattoni 
(2018) called for investigation of factors that may impede boards’ efficacy and the 
implication of these for firm value. Unfortunately, with the exception of Fracassi and Tate 
(2012) and Kang et al. (2018), no systematic attention has been given to the effects of board-
CEO friendship ties on firm value. It is pertinent to note that, Fracassi and Tate (2012) and 
Kang et al (2018) examined the effects of CEO-director social connection on board selection, 
firm value and firm innovation respectively. However, they ignored the channels through 
which such connections affect firm value. Crucially, it remains unclear, how friendship ties 
between board directors and CEOs may impact firm value, and, assuming such ties matter for 
firm value, through which channels
5
 (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). This study attempts to 
address this gap.  
We address these two key research questions using a rich dataset containing 14,433 firm-
year observations drawn from 1,696 publicly listed U.S. firms from 2000 to 2014. To 
                                                        
5 Following prior theoretical work (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Linck et al., 2008) we identify board monitoring 














examine how board-CEO friendship ties impact firm value, we follow recent studies 
(Fracassi and Tate, 2012; Khanna et al., 2015; Schmidt, 2015), in specifying two friendship 
tie measures: Friendship Tie Breadth, defined as the number of directors with friendship ties 
to the CEO divided by the total number of board directors, and, Friendship Tie Depth, 
computed as the number of friendship ties a CEO has with board directors divided by the 
total number of board directors. We specify Tobin's Q
6
 as our main proxy for firm value and 
check the robustness of our results using alternative performance measures (including, Total 
Q, the volatility of firm profitability, the Demerjian et al. (2012) measure of managerial 
ability and using various proxies for board advising and monitoring functions).  
By way of preview, our main results reveal that both the breadth and depth of board-
CEO friendship ties are negatively and significantly related to firm value, although the impact 
of breadth ties appears stronger. Regarding the channels through which board-CEO network 
ties matter, we find the effects of interactions between CEO-board friendship ties and 
monitoring variables (i.e., CEO duality, tenure and CEO share ownership) to be negative, 
which suggests that such ties lead to loss of firm value through the monitoring channel. 
However, interactions between CEO-board friendship ties and proxies representing the need 
for advising (i.e. size, firm diversification and research & development intensity) are positive 
and significant, which indicate that such ties can contribute positively to firm value by 
improving the quality of board advising. Our results are robust to further tests, including the 
use of alternative model specifications that control for professional ties, additional variables, 
as well as for sources of endogeneity.  
Our study makes three primary contributions. First, by combining agency theory and 
RBV, it furthers our understanding on how social ties between boards and managers 
                                                        














influence firm value. More specifically, we show that board-CEO friendship ties are 
associated with firm value. Over the past two decades, the press, academics and practitioners 
have raised concerns about board composition, monitoring and advising roles of the board, 
due to the waves of corporate scandals and frauds that continue to destroy firm value. The 
findings of our study yield fresh insight on the consequences of board-CEO social ties on 
firm value. In particular, our results reinforce the view that, whereas social ties may lead to 
effective counsel, such ties work to undermine the monitoring effectiveness of boards, 
leading to negative implications for firm value. We provide incremental evidence with 
respect to the direct value relevance of board-CEO social ties; extending the studies by 
Westphal (1999), Kang et al. (2018) and Fracassi and Tate (2012) by showing that social ties 
are associated with losses in firm value whereas professional ties are not. Specifically, 
exploiting exogenous departures of friendship-tied directors attributable to retirements or 
deaths, our findings reveal that director deaths or retirements linked to the loss of CEO 
friendship tied directors are associated with an increase of 3.21% in firm value, relative to the 
departures of non-friendship-tied directors or unconnected directors. 
Second, we contribute evidence as to how CEO-board friendship ties impact firm 
value by analysing the role of board advising and monitoring as potential channels through 
which board-CEO friendship ties may impact firm value. Theoretically, it is unclear whether 
board advisory and monitoring functions are complementary or conflicting (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2007). However, exploration of these channels is important because the impact of 
the board on firm value is likely to be heterogeneous across firms (Adams and Ferreira, 
2009). Our evidence suggests that both board advising and monitoring are plausible 
mechanisms through which board-CEO friendship ties affect firm value, and that they are 
generally complementary. In this regard our paper adds to theoretical understanding as to 














Lastly, we reconcile ambiguous predictions in the literature regarding relations 
between CEO-board ties and firm-level outcomes by demonstrating that friendship ties have a 
negative impact on firm value, but that this negative impact is mitigated in firms with higher 
advising needs. Our results here speak to the heterogeneous impact of such ties across firms 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009). In short, we show that the negative influence of board-CEO 
friendship ties on firm value is reduced in complex firms with higher advising needs but 
amplified in less complex firms with higher monitoring requirements. Assessing the relative 
strength of both channels, we further reveal that board monitoring is the strongest channel 
through which declines in firm value attributable to board-CEO friendship ties occur.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant theoretical 
literature and develops the hypothesis of the study. Section 3 describes the data, introduces 
variables and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents our empirical findings. Section 
5 concludes. 
2. Hypothesis development 
Theoretical explanations of the effects of the board-CEO relationship, which may be 
formal (professional) or informal (social network connections), are rooted in two 
perspectives, namely, agency theory and RBV. From an agency standpoint, effective boards 
independently monitor and evaluate strategic decisions and performance of the firm (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). Research evidence support the notion that competent monitoring is 
achieved by the board whose composition is dominated by outside directors (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989; Dalton et al., 1998). In this study, we argue that friendship ties may exert a 
negative influence on firm value because such ties imply a similarity of beliefs, attitudes, 
traits and a strong psychological bond between individuals (Allan, 1979). Friendship ties 














Thus, friendship ties may lead to familiarity bias and undermine the quality of board 
monitoring and directors’ fiduciary duties (Boeker, 1992; Linck et al., 2008; Bruynseels and 
Cardinaels, 2014), including board effectiveness in monitoring corporate strategy and 
decisions (Westphal, 1999; Fracassi and Tate, 2012).  Boeker (1992) and Fahlenbrach and 
Stulz (2009) offer support for this view and suggest CEO- board social ties should not only 
serve as a signal of weak corporate governance to the market, but also tend to exacerbate 
agency costs - leading to erosion in firm value. 
In contrast, and drawing on RBV, researchers assert that social capital, defined as an 
asset that resides in a social relationship (Burt, 1992; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998), constitutes a 
valuable resource for the conduct of a firm’s strategy and hence impacts firm value (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal, 1998; Blyler and Coff, 2003). In this respect, corporate boards are viewed as 
providers of resources as they advise CEOs and executive management on firm strategy and 
other managerial issues (Wu, 2008; Johnson et al., 1996). This strand of literature argues that 
board-CEO friendship ties promote greater board involvement in corporate decision-making, 
which can contribute positively to firm value. For example, friendship-tied directors may be 
better positioned to signal discontent with firms’ corporate strategies; because a shared 
common background may make it easier for CEOs and directors to share information, which 
would have been more difficult to communicate without such connections (Houston et al., 
2018). Consistent with this, several studies (Hoitash, 2011; Fracassi and Tate, 2008; Raheja, 
2005; Harris and Raviv, 2006) view board-CEO friendship ties as a vehicle through which 
valuable information can flow between CEOs and directors.  
Overall, theoretical arguments infer that board-CEO friendship ties may, on one hand, 
weaken the monitoring role of the board, whilst, conversely, improve the board advising role. 














through which such ties influence, remains unclear. Moreover, the dynamic nature of board-
CEO relationships and their uncertain firm value effects, calls for a multi-theoretical 
perspective and rigorous empirical analyses to disentangle their effect (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1996; Wu, 2008).  This study attempts to address this gap. In light of the above, 
we formulate the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: Board-CEO friendly ties are associated with loss of firm value. 
Hypothesis 1b: Board-CEO friendly ties are associated with increases in firm value. 
Hypothesis 2: Board-CEO friendship ties will serve to strengthen the quality of board 
advising, leading to increases in firm value. 
Hypothesis 3: Board-CEO friendship ties will serve to undermine the quality of board 
monitoring, leading to losses in firm value. 
 
3. Data and variable measurement 
3.1 Data 
Our sample of U.S. firms is derived from BoardEx, Compustat, and CRSP databases. 
We begin by sourcing information on the biographical characteristics of directors and CEOs 
of publicly listed U.S. firms from BoardEx. This rich dataset provides demographic 
information such as age, gender, and historical activities such as employment record, social 
activity engagement (e.g., charity and leisure clubs), education background (including degree, 
graduation year and institution names) for each board director and CEO. Our initial sample 
consists of 18,432 firm-years observations from firms with complete information on social tie 
connections between 2000 and 2014
7
. To this dataset, we match firm financials and market 
data from Compustat and CRSP databases, excluding financial and public utility firms from 
                                                        
7 Like Francassi and Tate (2012), to avoid issues with survivorship bias, we do not include observations before 














our sample. Our matched sample includes 2,786 unique CEOs and 20,487 directors drawn 
from 1,696 U.S. firms. The final unbalanced dataset boasts 14,433 firm-year observations 
from 2000-2014.  
3.2 Variable descriptions 
3.2.1 Dependent variable 
Our main dependent variable is firm value and we specify Tobin’s Q as our first measure of 
firm value following previous studies (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Coles et al., 2008; Hwang 
and Kim, 2009; Carter et al., 2010; Fracassi and Tate, 2012; Khanna et al., 2015). Widely-
employed as a measure of firm value, Tobin’s Q is calculated as the ratio of the market value 
of assets
8
 to book value of assets, computed at an annual frequency (Coles et al., 2008; 
Fracassi and Tate, 2012). Our second measure of firm value is Total Q (as introduced by 
Peters and Taylor (2017))
9, which is computed as a firm’s market value divided by its total 
capital: where total capital is defined as the sum of its physical and intangible capital, both 
measured at replacement cost. In this calculation, the replacement cost of a firm’s intangible 
capital is computed by accumulating prior investments in research and development and 
selling, general and administrative expenses. Peters and Taylor (2017) demonstrate that their 
new measure, which incorporates intangible capital in the denominator (i.e., the replacement 
cost of a firm’s capital), is a superior proxy for firm value than Tobin’s Q, in terms of 
capturing firms’ physical and intangible investment opportunities. 
 
3.2.2 Explanatory variables  
                                                        
8 We calculate a firm’s market value as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity, plus the market 
value of equity. 














In line with recent studies (e.g., Schmidt, 2015; Kang, et al., 2018), we classify a director as 
friendship-tied to the CEO if she has shared educational background or memberships of 
social organizations, such as golf clubs, fraternities, charitable organizations, trusts and 
university boards, during overlapping years with the CEO. Our focus is on non-professional 
ties, since professional ties established through shared past and present employment outside 
the firm tend to be transactional and competitive in nature (Khanna et al., 2015; Kang et al., 
2018). In contrast, non-professional ties are more likely to foster friendship (trust and loyalty) 
between these two parties and this plays an important role in information sharing (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009; Westphal, 1999; Westphal, et al., 2006; Kroll et al., 2008).  
We employ two principal friendship tie measures: Friendship Tie Breadth and 
Friendship Tie Depth (Fracassi and Tate, 2012; Khanna et al., 2015; Schmidt, 2015). 
Friendship Tie Breadth is defined as the number of directors with friendship-ties to the CEO 
divided by the total number of board directors. The value of Friendship Tie Breadth ranges 
from zero to one. A value of zero would mean that no board directors have CEO friendship 
ties, whilst a value of one would indicate that all board directors possess friendship ties with 
the CEO. Friendship Tie Depth is computed as the total number of friendship ties the CEO 
has with board directors divided by the total number of board directors. The value of 
Friendship Tie Depth ranges from zero at the lower bound and rises with the number of 
connections. For instance, Friendship Tie Depth would exceed a value of one if individual 
directors have multiple sources of friendship ties with the CEO, which would imply a 
stronger strength of the friendship-tie. While we expect tie breadth and depth to impact on 
firm value, we are theoretically agonistic regarding the strength and direction of their effects 















3.2.3 Control Variables 
For CEO characteristics, we employ CEO Duality, a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO 
also serves as chairman of the board. Stevenson and Radin (2009) find that CEO friendship-
tied directors wield greater board power and that their influence is strongest if the CEO also 
serves as board chair. Since the manager fixed effects literature attributes differences in firm 
performance according to whether CEOs were externally, or internally recruited (Custodio 
and Metzger, 2014), we also include: CEO Outside, a dummy variable equal to one if the 
CEO was recruited from outside the focal firm, and CEO Age, the natural logarithm of CEO 
age, to proxy for proximity to retirement age (Linck et al., 2008; Custodio and Metzger, 
2014). We control for CEOs implicit equity based risk-taking incentives (Custodio and 
Metzger, 2014; Ali and Zhang, 2015) with CEO Stock Option, the value of in-the-money 
stock options owned by the CEO, comprising exercisable and un-exercisable stock options 
(Custodio and Metzger, 2014); CEO Share Ownership, calculated as the percentage of 
outstanding common shares held by the CEO (Ali and Zhang, 2015; Schmidt, 2015; Khanna 
et al., 2015).  
To control for board structure, we include Board Size, the natural logarithm of the 
total number of directors on the board (Schmidt, 2015, and Board Independence %, computed 
as the number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors on the board 
(Linck et al., 2008; Fracassi and Tate, 2012; Ali and Zhang, 2015; Schmidt, 2015; Kang et al., 
2018). Linck et al. (2012) show that board size and structure has evolved over time - 
especially between pre- and post-SOX periods. Existing studies offer generally conflicting 
evidence as to how board size and board independence influence firm performance. Ali and 
Zhang (2015) find that a CEOs’ propensity to overstate firm earnings varies with CEO tenure, 














and Tate (2012) show that larger boards are associated with lower firm valuations but find no 
significant effects attributable to board independence.  
Finally, following prior studies (e.g., Cornett et al., 2009; Fracassi and Tate, 2012) we also 
employ several additional common controls for firm characteristics; Stock Volatility: the 
annualized variance of daily stock returns as a measure of total risk; Leverage: the total debt 
over total assets to control for differences in firms’ capital structure; Sales Growth: the annual 
growth rate of sales; and Total Assets: the natural logarithm of total assets as a measure of 
firm size. The manner in which these variables are measured is provide in Appendix A.  
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for the main variables and all sample firms
10
. 
Beginning with dependent variables, shown in Panel A, Tobin’s Q has a slightly right skewed 
distribution with a mean (median) of 1.41 (1.02). Total Q, similarly, has a slight right skewed 
distribution with a mean (median) of 1.77 (0.94). These statistics are consistent with recent 
studies (Faleye, 2007; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2009; Peters and Taylor, 2017). In terms of 
board-CEO friendship, Friendship Tie Breadth indicates that a mean (median) 8% (6%) of 
board directors have friendship ties with the CEO. At the maximum, 80% of board directors 
are friendship-tied to the CEO. Friendship Tie Depth has a mean of 0.24, indicating that each 
CEO has an average 0.24 friendship ties with each director. A median value of 0.27 implies 
that each CEO has at least one friendship tie with one out of four directors. Regarding control 
variables, a quarter of firms have a CEO who serves in a dual capacity as both CEO and 
board Chairman. A typical CEO is aged 56 years old and holds stock options with a value of 
$26 million dollars. Firms exhibit a preference for internally hired CEOs, with only 20% of 
                                                        
10 We winsorize all continuous variable at the first and ninety-ninth percentile to control for potential outliers. 














CEOs being externally recruited. Boards have a mean (median) of 10 (9) directors, and 
independent directors account for 76.1% of board seats. With respect to firm characteristics, 
firms have total assets around $5,000 million dollars at the mean, and book leverage of 20%. 
Firms have stock volatility with a mean value of 0.2648 and average growth in sales of 30%. 
These figures are similar to those reported in other studies (Fracassi and Tate, 2012; 
Armstrong et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2014; Ali and Zhang, 2015).  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
In Appendix B, we present the correlation matrix for all independent variables. 
Friendship Tie Breadth and Friendship Tie Depth are positively and significantly related, 
suggesting that a board with more friendship-tied directors tends to have a higher number of 
friendship ties between directors and the CEO. CEO Duality CEO Age and CEO Share 
Ownership are positively correlated to Friendship Tie Breadth and Friendship Tie Depth, 
indicating that more experienced and powerful CEOs are more likely to gain external 
friendship ties with existing board members. Outside CEOs tend to have less friendship ties 
with directors. Firms with more directors on the board, and larger firms, tend to have broader 
and deeper friendship ties between the board and the CEO. Other correlation coefficients 
between independent variables are small on average, with average correlation coefficients 
below 0.05 on average, suggesting that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a significant 





                                                        
11 Variable inflation factor scores range from 2.978-7.482 and well below a cut-off point of 10, indicating that 














4. Results and discussion 
4.1 Board-CEO ties and firm value 
To examine the impact of board-CEO friendship ties on firm value, we estimate the 
following fixed-effect panel model: 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡              
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑇𝑖𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡)    
+ 𝛽3(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛽4(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡)       
+  𝛽5(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝐸𝑖) + 𝛽6(𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸𝑡) + ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                     (1)                
Where Firm Value, is Tobin’s Q or Total Q. Friendship Tie Measures are captured by 
our two principal measures of board-CEO friendship ties: Friendship Tie Breadth or 
Friendship Tie Depth. We include three vectors of control variables that control for CEO 
Characteristics, Board Characteristics, and Firm Characteristics. Firm fixed-effects (Firm 
FE) and year fixed-effects (Year FE) are included to help mitigate endogeneity concerns 
from omitted variables. The error term is ɛ𝑖,𝑡, and we cluster model standard errors at the 
firm-level to account for serial correlation of the error term. 
Table 2 reports estimates from our fixed-effect regressions, which include both 
friendship tie measures: Friendship Tie Breadth and Friendship Tie Depth. Columns (1) and 
(2) show that Friendship Tie Breadth is negatively and significantly related to Tobin’s Q and 
Total Q at the 5% level or above. The economic magnitude is substantial. For example, in 
column (1), the coefficient of Friendship Tie Breadth (-0.3022) on Tobin’s Q implies that a 
one standard deviation increase in Friendship Tie Breadth leads to a decrease of 4.05 














induces a decrease of approximately 2.87% ($281 million) in firm value. Friendship Tie 
Breadth has an even more substantial impact on Total Q (column (2)). In column (2), the 
coefficient of Friendship Tie Breadth (-1.3033) on Total Q implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in Friendship Tie Breadth leads to a decrease of 17.46 percentage points in 
Total Q. Given the sample mean of Total Q of 1.77, this effect induces a decrease of 
approximately 9.88% in firm value. 
 In terms of depth of board-CEO friendship ties, Columns (3) and (4) show that 
Friendship Tie Depth has a negative and statistically significant influence on firm value. In 
terms of economic magnitude, given a Friendship Tie Depth coefficient of -0.0022 (in 
column (5)), a one standard deviation increase of Friendship Tie Depth leads to a decrease of 
0.02% in Tobin’s Q, which translates as a $1.64 million value reduction in firm value. Given 
a Friendship Tie Depth coefficient of -0.0145 (in column (5)), a one standard deviation 
increase of Friendship Tie Depth leads to a decrease of 0.87% in Total Q. Taken together, our 
results are supportive of the conjecture that board-CEO friendship ties, are associated with 
increased agency cost, and reduction in firm value. Hypotheses 1a and 1b are therefore 
supported. The logic of our findings complies with those of Hwang and Kim (2009), Fracassi 
and Tate (2012), and Nguyen (2012).  
Regarding control variables, CEO Duality has a positive influence on firm value at the 
5% level in the case of Tobin’s Q. This is interesting from the perspective that duality is often 
associated with greater CEO power and weakening of board monitoring (Cornett et al., 2009; 
Akbar et al., 2017). However, CEO Duality is not significant in the case of Total Q. As noted 
by Bartlett and Partnoy (2018), some of the observed relations for governance variables 
observable for Tobin’s Q may not hold for Total Q because this measure serves to address 














similar results for CEOs equity pay (as proxied by CEO Stock Option). In particular, we 
observe weak evidence that increases in CEO Stock Option is associated with a decline in 
Tobin’s Q but not Total Q.  However, the coefficients for CEO Stock Option imply no 
material impact on firm value. In contrast, point estimates for CEO Share Ownership imply a 
loss in firm value (Tobin’s Q) in line with increases in CEOs share ownership. Prior studies 
provide evidence that CEOs have stronger incentives to manipulate earnings when their total 
compensation is more closely tied to the value of stock and option holdings (e.g., Cornett et 
al., 2009), which results in erosion of firm value. Board Size and Board Independence 
percentage have negative impacts on firm value but only in the case of Total Q. Our findings 
with respect to the impact of board size and independence on firm value, may tentatively 
imply that board-CEO friendship ties capture true independence (and incentives to monitor) 
better than conventional independence. We also find that firm size ((Log (Total Assets)) and 
Leverage are both significantly and negatively related to firm value in all regressions. This 
may imply that greater size and higher financial distress could hamper the firms’ 
development and growth in the future. Stock Volatility and Sales Growth (in the case of 
Tobin’s Q), reflecting a higher growth potential, have a positive impact on firm value.  
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
4.2 Channels through which friendship ties matter 
In this section, we explore potential channels through which these losses may be conveyed. 
Consistent with existing theory (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Linck et al., 2008), we consider 
board advising and monitoring, as two, and to some extent mutually exclusive channels, 
through which board-CEO friendship ties may generate changes in firm value (Linck et al., 
2008). First, board advising involves provision of advice and counsel to CEOs (Westphal, 














board members and CEOs may encourage active dialogue between CEOs and directors, and 
increase the quality of board advising (Westphal, 1999; Adams and Ferreira, 2007). Prior 
studies suggest that increases in the quality of board advising may positively impact on firm 
performance (Ingram and Roberts, 2000; Adams and Ferreria, 2007; Schmidt, 2015). Schmidt 
(2015) finds that merger announcement market returns are largest in firms with greater board 
advising needs. In addition, the impact of board advising on firm operations is expected to 
vary considerably among firms. One important reason being that the need for board advising 
increases with the complexity of a firm’s operations advising needs (Coles et al., 2008; Linck 
et al., 2008, Faleye et al., 2011). Considering these findings, we conjecture that the board 
advising channel should work to mitigate the negative impact of CEO friendship-tied 
directors on firm value. Furthermore, that this mitigating effect will vary with respect to the 
extent of a firm’s complexity.  
Following convention in the literature (Coles et al., 2008; Faleye, 2011) we proxy for 
firm complexity using the following three proxies: Sales (total firm sales), Diversified Firm 
(whether a firm operates in more than two industry segments according to SIC digit 
classification), and R&D Intensity (ratio of R&D expenses to total assets). The intuition is 
thus. First, because larger firms tend to have more outside contracting relationships and 
higher co-ordination needs, they require more board advising (Coles et al., 2008)
12
. Second, 
since firms operating in multiple industry segments face multi-dimensional operating 
challenges and competition, they stand to benefit most from board advising (Yermack, 1996). 
Third, because R&D intensive firms face higher project verification costs, they are expected 
to have greater board advising needs. 
                                                        
12  Furthermore, and as argued in Adams and Ferreira (2003), cited in Markarian and Parbonetti (2007), 
controlling for firm diversification is further important for isolating the effect of CEO-director ties on firm value 
is further important because investors tend to discount the cash flows of poorly diversified firms relative to 














A second important channel through which directors may matter is the board 
monitoring function.  For instance, it is widely documented that a primary duty of the board 
is to monitor (and potentially discipline) CEOs. Friendship connectedness between boards 
and CEOs could impair directors’ willingness to monitor CEOs and to ‘blow the whistle’ on 
issues with management integrity and competence (Hwang and Kim, 2009; Nguyen, 2012; 
Fracassi and Tate, 2012; Bruynseels and Cardinaels, 2014; Rose, 2014; Wilbanks et al., 
2017). Previous studies find that ineffective board monitoring induces CEOs’ self-seeking 
behaviours, such as: excessive level of executive consumption and earnings management 
(Rose et al., 2014; Bruynseels and Cardinaels, 2014; Krishnan et al., 2011; Armstrong et al., 
2014), which could result in firm efficiency, fraud or even corporate bankruptcy (Khanna et 
al., 2015). For example, Armstrong et al. (2014) find that increases in board monitoring can 
effectively reduce agency costs through greater management disclosure and improved analyst 
following. Moreover, since previous studies generally associate poor corporate governance 
(higher agency costs) with reduced firm performance (Bhagat and Bolton, 2013), we expect 
that board-CEO friendship ties exacerbate losses in firm value when agency conflicts are 
more severe.   
Based on previous studies, we utilize CEO duality, independent board proportion and 
board appointed after CEO ratio to proxy for firm corporate governance (Westphal and Zajac, 
1995; Pathan, 2009; Morse et al., 2011; Fracassi and Tate, 2012; Baldenius et al., 2014; Coles 
et al., 2014; Khanna et al., 2015). CEO duality limits the information flow to other board 
directors and then decreases the efficiency of board monitoring, and thus firms with the CEO 
as the chairman of the board need the board to put more efforts on monitoring. Independent 
directors are generally believed to be better monitors of CEOs since they attempt to maintain 
their reputation in directorship market. So, firms with larger percentage of independent 














are appointed during a CEO’s tenure, directors tend to be beholden to the CEO because the 
CEO is heavily involved in recruiting, nominating and appointing them, and then they are 
less likely to discipline the CEO. So, firms with higher percentage of directors appointed after 
the CEO tend to less effective in board monitoring.  
Based on the discussion of advising and monitoring channels we specify six proxies 
for monitoring channels and three for advising channels motivated by recent studies. In 
particular we specify the following ‘monitoring’ variables: CEO Duality (Cornett et al., 2009; 
Akbar et al., 2017), Founder CEO (Antia et al. 2010), CEO Tenure, CEO Share Ratio (Ali 
and Zhang, 2015; Schmidt, 2015; Khanna et al., 2015), CEO Education (King et al., 2016), 
and CEO Decision Horizon (Antia et al. 2010), and the following ‘advising’ proxies: Firm 
Sales, Firm Diversification, and R&D Intensity (Coles et al., 2008), respectively
13
 
In Table 3, we begin by running alternative regressions, specifying the various 
monitoring and advising proxies as moderating factors that may influence the impact of 
board-CEO friendship ties on firm value, and accordingly interact each proxy with 
Friendship-Tie Breadth
14
. In columns (1)-(6), which examine the monitoring channel, we 
observe consistently, irrespective of specific proxy, negative and significant interactions 
between monitoring proxies and Friendship Tie Breadth. Our results suggest that one 
important mechanism through which friendship ties reduce firm value is by weakening the 
board monitoring function. In columns (7)-(9) of the same table we consider the proxies for 
the board advising channel. We find that each of the interactions between advising proxies 
and friendship ties is positive and significant. Interestingly the results suggest, consistent with 
an RBV, that there is an ‘upside’ to friendship ties between CEOs and directors. In particular, 
                                                        
13 We also conducted analyses using alternative monitoring proxies including founder CEOs and firm Cash 
Flows and obtain similar results.  
14 For brevity we do not show results for the Friendship Tie Depth measure. However we obtain similar results. 














the results suggest that such ties strengthen the quality of board advising, which can generate 
increases in firm value. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are therefore supported. 
                                        [Insert Table 3 here] 
 Whilst the monitoring and advising proxies used in this study are widely established 
in the literature, it may be the case that some of our proxies may not sufficiently capture 
monitoring and advising functions. We employ factor analysis to further investigate the 
extent to which these variables explain advising and monitoring roles of the board. Table 4 
Panel A reports the results of the factor analysis. The results indicate that monitoring and 
advising factors have eingenvalues of 2.6134 and 1.8884 respectively and are greater than 
one. The variables which include: CEO Duality, CEO Tenure, CEO Share Ownership, CEO 
Education, CEO Decision Horizon (the Monitoring factor), and Firm Sales, Firm 
Diversification and R&D Intensity (the Advising index), account for a total of 89.46 percent 
of observed variance in monitoring and advising roles of the board. Indeed, the results 
confirm that these variables capture about 90 percent of the monitoring and advising 
functions of the board.  
Panel B of the same table presents the results of interaction between friendship tie 
breadth, monitoring and advising (Friendship Tie Breadth*Monitoring index and Friendship 
Tie Breadth*Advising index). We document that board friendship ties reduce firm value 
through the monitoring channel whilst they can potentially improve firm value by improving 
the quality of board advising. We carried out similar analysis for friendship tie depth, 
monitoring and advising but the results not reported here appear the same. 















4.3 Controlling for board-CEO professional ties  
Although we have shown that board-CEO friendship ties can lead to reductions in firm value 
and the channels through such value changes occur, a remaining concern is that our board-
CEO friendship tie measures may be correlated with professional ties. We therefore explore 
how professional ties differ from friendship ties by focusing on the advising channel, which 
the results thus far have shown to be positive. For instance, it may be the case that 
professional ties between CEOs and directors, rather than friendship ties, are driving the 
positive changes in firm value through the advising channels. To address this concern, we 
introduce controls for board-CEO professional ties to our regression framework, whilst 
including the proxies for board advising (Firm Sales, Firm Diversification, and R&D 
Intensity) explored in the previous section.  
Following recent studies (Fracassi and Tate; 2012; Khanna et al., 2015; Schmidt, 
2015), we classify a director as having professional ties with the CEO if she has shared past 
and present employments outside the firm with the CEO. Thus, we specify Professional Tie 
Breadth, computed as the number of board directors with professional ties to the CEO 
divided by the number of directors on the board. 
Table 5 reports the results of the fixed-effect regressions that examine the impact of 
friendship ties on firm value (proxied by Tobin’s Q)15 and which explicitly control for board-
CEO professional ties. Examining the results for the singular effects of friendship ties, we 
continue to find that our measures of friendship ties are significant and negative in sign 
(across all regressions), and in fact become larger in magnitude. In contrast, we find some 
                                                        
15
 We exclude analysis using Total Q as the measure of firm value in this table for reasons of brevity. However, 
our results are quantitatively unchanged if we instead specify Total Q as the outcome variable. We also focus on 
Friendship Tie Breadth and Friendship Tie Depth measures in this table for reasons of brevity. Alterative results 
using Total Q and Friendship Tie Depth and Professional Tie Depth (calculated as the number of professional 
ties that the CEO has with directors divided by the total number of board directors) are available from the 














weak evidence that professional ties may yield positive changes in firm value (in one out of 
three regressions at a 10 percent level of significance). Considering the results for interactions 
between friendship and professional ties with the proxies for board advising we find that both 
friendship and professional ties can contribute more positively to firm value in firms with 
higher sales, greater diversification and in more R&D intensive firms.  
Our evidence indicates that board-CEO friendship ties have their own independent 
influence on firm value, and thus should be considered distinct from board-CEO professional 
ties. From a board monitoring point of view, the impact of friendship ties on firm value 
supports an agency cost view, whereas professional ties, which have a weak positive effect on 
firm value, offer greater support for a RDV of such ties. This interesting result tentatively 
implies that directors with professional ties to CEOs contribute positively to firm value, and 
to some extent serve to offset the negative influence of board-CEO friendship ties on firm 
value (Ingram and Roberts, 2000; Adams and Ferreira, 2007). 
 [Insert Table 5 here] 
 
4.4. Endogeneity concerns  
So far we employed fixed-effect regressions to address issues with unobserved 
heterogeneity if it is attributable to a firm fixed effect. However, the use of fixed effects do 
not explicitly address further sources of endogeneity, namely: simultaneity and reverse 
causality (Wintoki et al., 2012). For example, friendship ties between board members and 
CEOs may be a function of past firm performance, i.e. reverse causality. Furthermore, board-
CEO friendship tie measures may be correlated with other variables and also mechanically 














board-CEO friendship ties. First, we employ the fixed effects 2SLS (FE-2SLS) estimator and 
instrument for board-CEO friendship-ties using deaths and retirements of directors (Fracassi 
and Tate, 2012; Falato et al., 2014). Second and thirdly, we exploit the exogenous shock of 
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) as well as the 2007-2009 financial crisis, in 
order to more clearly show whether friendship ties negatively impact firm value following a 
regulatory shock that impacts firms differentially dependent upon existing board structure 
and following a significant negative economic shock, respectively. 
Deaths and retirements of directors: Instrumental variables 
We first address endogeneity concerns by introducing instrumental variables (IV) into 
our fixed-effect framework and employing the fixed effects-2SLS (FE-2SLS) estimator. A 
specific challenge we face is in identifying suitable instruments that are exogenous to firm 
performance but strongly correlated with our board-CEO friendship tie measures. We 
propose the retirements and deaths of directors who have friendship ties with the CEO as two 
suitable instruments, and define two dummy variables: Death of Director as a variable equal 
to one if a director with friendship ties dies, and Retirement of Director, which is equal to one 
if a departing director with friendship ties is at, or above, a firm’s mandatory retirement age 
(Fracassi and Tate, 2012). This identification strategy draws on the notion that director 
departures, owing to retirement or death, are not plausibly driven by changes in firm value 
itself (Fracassi and Tate, 2012; Falato et al., 2014). However, it could be argued that the 
possible anticipation of some director deaths and retirements could violate the above 
assumption. On one hand, director deaths include not only sudden deaths due to heart attack, 
stroke, accident or murder, defined by Nguyen and Nielsen (2010), but also deaths due to 
prolonged illnesses, complications from specified diseases and surgery, which can be 














year of their deaths or one year before because it indicates at least some surprises or un-
expectations in their passing (Fracassi and Tate, 2012).  
On the other hand, although the fact that some directors still remain on boards when 
they have reached firms’ mandatory retirement ages creates some surprises of their final 
retirement dates, director retirements are still easier to anticipate. This is because directors’ 
final retirement dates are probably not only influenced by age and personal considerations, 
but also by firm performance. For instance, during the underperformance periods, directors 
might be more likely to retire. The study of Fracassi and Tate (2012) has eliminated this 
probability by showing the evidence that directors with friendship ties tend to retire when 
firms perform well, while firm performance is not related to the retirement times of directors 
with no friendship ties. Further, our evidence regarding the F-test and the Sargan-Hansen test 
suggests the validity of these two instrumental variables to some extent. 
To construct our instruments, we identify all director retirements and deaths within 
our sample, and observe 658 director deaths and 2976 retirements. Of the directors who died 
during our sample period, 83 are friendship-tied to the CEO. Of the directors who retired 
during our sample period, 296 are friendship-tied to the CEO. In terms of predicted signs, we 
anticipate that our instruments will reduce both Friendship Tie Breadth and Friendship Tie 
Depth significantly. One important reason that it seems implausible that CEOs can 
immediately replace friendship-tied directors with equally friendship-tied new directors.  
Table 6 presents the results of the 2SLS-FE estimator. Columns (1) and (4) present 
first stage regression results. The coefficients for Death of Director and Retirement of 
Director are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that the 
unexpected departures of directors who are friendship-tied to the CEO, due to deaths or 














our instruments, values for the F-test on the significance of our instruments exceed the 
critical value of 10% suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997)
16
 the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the endogenous regressors. The Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions lends further support to the validity of our instruments, since we observe that p-
values are statistically insignificant at conventional levels in all regressions. 
In the second stage results, we regress firm value on the predicted values of 
Friendship Tie Breadth (columns (2) and (3)) and Friendship Tie Depth (columns (5) and (6)) 
from the first-stage regressions. Consistent with our earlier results, we observe that the 
predicted values for Friendship Tie Breadth and Friendship Tie Depth are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition, IV estimates of the coefficients for 
Friendship Tie Breadth (Depth) are larger than the baseline estimates. For example, the 
coefficient of Friendship Tie Breadth (Depth) on Tobin’s Q is almost one times (three times) 
larger than that in the baseline regressions. This fact suggests that our baseline fixed-effect 
regressions likely underestimate the true causal negative effect of board-CEO friendship ties 
on firm value. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
In unreported tests we also probe the robustness of our difference-in-difference analysis 
by examining the post-effect of departures of friendly-tied directors from the board on firm 
value (proxied by Tobin’s Q and Total Q) using actual departures and using ‘falsified’ 
placebo departure events. Our results show a significant positive impact on firm value 
following departures of friendly-tied directors but an insignificant effect in the case of 
placebo departure events. 
                                                        
16 Our instruments also exceed critical values according to Stock and Yogo (2005) bias and size methods. We 














Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis 
To further mitigate the endogeneity issues, we examine the impact of CEO-director 
friendship ties on firm value following the passage of SOX and during the recent 2007-2009 
financial crisis. We begin by exploiting the new listing rules enacted by Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
(SOX) in 2002 and correspondingly implemented by NYSE and NASDAQ (Linck et al., 
2008). Specifically, the firms listed in NYSE and NASDAQ are required by the new rules to 
have a majority of the board of directors to be independent, thus forcing an exogenous change 
in board composition. Non-compliant firms are mandated to enhance the board independence, 
which creates an exogenous change in board composition (or board-CEO friendship ties
17
) 
and enables us to identify the causal effect of board-CEO friendship ties on firm value.  
Following Coles et al. (2014) and Chang and Wu (2017), we employ a modified DID 
specification to isolate the clean effect of board-CEO friendship ties on firm value
18
, which is 
presented below: 
                                                        
17 Krishnan et al. (2011) find that the number of directors with social connections to CEOs has experienced an 
increase in the post- SOX period.
 
18 The main difference from the normal DID is that we can differentiate or isolate the clean effect of board 
composition (or board-CEO friendship ties) on firm value from the direct effect of other new rules enacted by 
SOX on firm value. The reason is that other new rules or regulations brought by SOX might have impacted 
monitoring or firm value through numerous channels other than board-CEO friendship ties. For instance, the 
audit committee is required to directors with financial expertise, and CEOs are required to disclosure internal 















𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡   
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑇𝑖𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝛽2(𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑇𝑖𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑂𝑋 𝑡)
+  𝛽3(𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑇𝑖𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡)
+  𝛽4(𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑇𝑖𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑂𝑋 𝑡)
+ 𝛽5(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑂𝑋 𝑡)+𝛽6(𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖)
+ 𝛽7(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡)    + 𝛽8(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡)
+  𝛽9(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡)  + 𝛽10(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝐸𝑖) + 𝛽11(𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 𝑡)
+ ɛ𝑖,𝑡            (2)                
Where Firm Value is proxied by Tobin’s Q or Total Q. Friendship Tie Measures is 
represented by Friendship Tie Breadth or Friendship Tie Depth. Non-compliant Firms is a 
dummy variable that equals one for those firms that had independent board ratios below 50% 
before the introduction of SOX in 2002, or zero otherwise. Post SOX is a dummy variable 
that equals one if year is after 2002, or zero otherwise. In equation (2), 𝛽1is the constant 
component that captures the impact of board-CEO friendship ties on firm value for compliant 
firms in the pre-SOX period, while 𝛽1+𝛽3 captures the impact of board-CEO friendship ties 
for non-compliant firms in the pre-SOX period. Both impacts include the bias due to 
endogeneity. 𝛽1+𝛽2 captures the effect of board-CEO friendship ties for compliant firms in 
the post-SOX period. This impact includes not only the effect of bias but also the direct effect 
of SOX (through channels other than board-CEO friendship ties).  
Because SOX imposes an exogenous shock on board composition of non-compliant 
firms, 𝛽1+𝛽2 + 𝛽3+𝛽4 captures both the clean effect of board-CEO friendship ties on firm 














clean estimates of the effect of board-CEO friendship ties (𝛽1 + 𝛽3+𝛽4) by subtracting the 
direct effect of SOX (𝛽2) from the combined effect (𝛽1+𝛽2 + 𝛽3+𝛽4). Specifically, since 
non-compliant firms are forced to enhance board independence after SOX, 𝛽1 + 𝛽3+𝛽4 
represents the clean estimates of the impact of board-CEO friendship ties on firm value 
following the exogenous change in board-CEO network ties induced by SOX (see Coles et al. 
(2014) for a thorough elaboration). Finally, equation (2) includes our vectors of control 
variables (CEO characteristics, Board Characteristics, and Firm Characteristics) as well as 
firm and year fixed effects. The error term is ɛ𝑖,𝑡, and model standard errors are clustered at 
the firm-level. 
The estimation results are reported in Panel A of Table 7. First, we calculate the sum 
of 𝛽1 + 𝛽3+𝛽4  at the bottom of the table, which reflects the clean estimates of the total 
impact of board-CEO friendship ties on our two measures of firm value (Tobin’s Q and Total 
Q). As can be seen, the clean estimates of board-CEO friendship ties on firm value remain 
negative and statistically significant. In addition, the economic magnitudes of our clean 
estimates are similar to those in the baseline regressions. Therefore, these results further 
corroborate our earlier findings, that, in order to maintain friendship ties directors are 
reluctant to monitor and challenge the CEO since this reduces the effectiveness of board 
monitoring and is associated with declines in firm value.  
Secondly, we calculate the sum of 𝛽1+𝛽2  (not presented in this table for brevity), and 
obtain negative and significant coefficients, which indicate that the negative impact of board-
CEO friendship ties on firm value for compliant firms is strengthened post-SOX. Thirdly, we 
calculate the sum of 𝛽1+𝛽3(not presented in this table for brevity) and also obtain negative 
and significant coefficients. This suggests that the negative effect of board-CEO friendship 














together, this evidence is consistent with the evidence of Krishnan et al. (2011) that after a 
compulsory increase in board independence, both compliant and non-compliant firms use 
friendship ties between the independent directors and the CEO as an alternative way to 
circumvent overly restrictive board monitoring. 
Next, in Panel B of Table 7, we explicitly control for the 2007-2009 financial crisis 
period and adopt a similar DID design. This is an important test since, for example, the 
negative impact of friendship ties on firm value via the monitoring channel may be 
intensified during adverse economic conditions. In support, Boeker (1992) argues that a 
friendly director is unlikely to challenge and/or contribute to the dismissal of a CEO 
especially during periods of financial crisis. To implement our test, we include a crisis 
dummy equal to 1 if the year is equal to 2007, 2008, or 2009 and interact the dummy with the 
friendship tie measures. As shown in Panel B, we find that firm value is significantly reduced 
during the crisis period and that friendship-ties contribute significantly to the losses in firm 
values. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
4.5 Other tests 
To demonstrate the robustness of our main findings, in unreported tests, available on request, 
we consider the impact of friendship ties on the volatility of firm performance as measured 
by the standard deviation of ROE and ROA based on the Demerjian et al. (2012) measure of 
managerial performance. The results remain similar to our main results, and that friendship 


















This study explores the effects of board composition and structure on firm value and 
the channels through which boards’ composition impact on firm value. We do so by 
employing a rich dataset of 14,433 firm-year observations over the period 2000-2014. Our 
analysis documents a number of interesting results. First, we find both the breadth and depth 
of board-CEO friendship ties are negatively and significantly related to firm value, although 
the impact of breadth ties appears stronger. Second, our results indicate that the board’s 
monitoring and advising as the main channels through which the board-CEO friendly ties 
affect firm value. Specifically, we find the effects of interactions between board-CEO 
friendship ties and board monitoring to be negative. However, interactions between board-
CEO friendship ties and board advising appear to be positive and significant indicating that 
such ties increase firm value by improving the quality of board advising. This finding is in 
line with predictions given by RBV. The finding that board-CEO friendship ties weaken the 
monitoring function of the board and reduce firm value renders support to the agency 
theoretical interpretations that such ties engender agency costs and reduce firm value.  
Furthermore, assessing potential channels through which friendship ties may 
influence firm value, we show that the negative impact of board-CEO friendship ties is 
mitigated in complex firms with higher advising needs but intensified in firms with lower 
corporate governance quality who have higher monitoring needs. Further analysis reveals that 
social ties tend to destroy firm value whereas professional ties do not. The study also reveals 














meaningful improvements in firm value, compared to departures of non-friendship-tied 
directors. Our results are robust to further tests, including endogeneity, unobserved 
heterogeneity, simultaneity, and reverse causality.  
Taken together, our results imply that friendship ties are of considerable importance 
and have potential implications for corporate governance reforms. In particular, they suggest 
that regulators, legislators and investors should consider the impact of board-CEO social ties, 
particularly, friendship ties, when evaluating the efficacy of firm corporate governance 
structures.  
Finally, we acknowledge some limitations of our study. First, despite the fact that our 
proxies for monitoring and advising have been extensively used in prior studies, they still 
may not fully capture a board’s monitoring and advising functions. Second, while our single 
country setting provides some potential interesting lessons to other developed and emerging 
economies it is unlikely to fully capture heterogeneity that may exist in the influence of social 
ties between countries. For example, prior studies have widely documented that in emerging 
countries such as China and India, board appointments are driven by social networks given 
the markedly fewer restrictions on board composition, particularly, the types of board 
connections (Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008). We contend that the effects of board-CEO 
social ties may be even more severe in these countries. Future studies may therefore wish to 
investigate whether and how board-CEO friendly ties, operationalized in the present study, 
impact firm value in cross-country settings. 
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                        Highlights 
 We examine the impact of board-CEO friendship ties on firm value and explore the 
channels of firm value. 
 




 Social ties tend to destroy firm value whereas professional ties do not. 
 
 We contribute to recent literature on how board-CEO network ties influence firm 
value. 
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